The moment is propitious to take a hard look at the efficacy of strategies designed to promote liberal political values in Islamic societies. The metaphoric democratic wave that gained impetus from the Soviet Union’s breakup has registered successes in most of the world. The Islamic world, the Arab Middle East in particular, still stands out among the regions resistant to democratization. Its unique strategic importance highlights the analytical and policy issues we place under the heading: Democracy & Islam. For Middle Eastern politics is at the heart of concerns about energy security, international terrorist movements, nuclear proliferation and the toxic effects of inflammatory crises in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon. The absence of accountable, representative governments is commonly cited as cause and reinforced effect of these turbulent conditions. In truth, the seeming correlation of authoritarian leadership and endemic conflict does not necessarily mean a strong causal connection. The objective reality, though, is that such a connection is assumed in the West – by intellectuals, politicians, policy-makers and publics. The saliency of the Middle East in their interest calculations and threat perceptions has reinforced the conviction that outside parties have reason and opportunity to inflect the course of political development there. Exigencies have and do intrude to force tactical qualification of this commitment to democracy. Yet, it continues to bulk large in thinking about the region’s stability.
Since 2001, the United States has spearheaded a multiform campaign of democracy promotion. Democracy at the point of a gun, democracy through tutelage, democracy through suasion and exhortation. The results range from the baneful to the discouraging. As Barack Obama prepares to enter the Oval office, he will have neither a viable program in place nor a clear line of retreat. A root-and-branch reappraisal of the premises ends and means of the campaign is an essential requisite for making needed adjustments. European governments should be part of that process. They have been junior partners in this historic enterprise, until now. Their efforts, for the most part, have been in parallel, occasionally in tandem, and in exceptional cases have followed different interpretations of the same score. This paper takes the convergence of strategic interest and political principles as a given even as it contrasts divergences between the American and a generalized European perspective.
The United States
Democracy promotion as a strategy is animated by American idealism. Idealism in the United States is exceptional in a number of respects. It expresses the belief in progress guided by reason that lies at the heart of the United States’ civic religion. America was born in a condition of ‘original virtue.’ America is seen as having a mission to serve as agent of a teleology in the world’s affairs that points to the global triumph of enlightened liberal principles. That mission is unique to the United States; yet the truth it embodies is taken to be universal. Hence, American tends to be inattentive to cultural differences even as it is ‘culture-blind’ in the positive sense of the term. History, too, is seen as yielding to the will of the well-intended. Therein lies the optimistic conviction that the United States can successfully sponsor what looks audaciously improbable to others. Therein lies as well the basis for the unquestioned assumption of its good intentions – and their power to succeed.
Those convictions were reinvigorated by victory in the Cold War and further reinforced by democracy’s implantation in the newly liberated countries of East and Central Europe. A program to foster a liberal form of politics in the Islamic world was a natural extension. Dedication to doing so received impetus from the so-called ‘war on terror’ launched with a vengeance after the horrific events of 9/11.
Afghanistan was the immediate target. Unseating the Taliban and installing an accountable government under Western patronage bolstered confidence in Washington and heightened ambitions. The Bush administration then set itself the objective of toppling Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The President’s men were persuaded that the elimination of a leader supposedly bent on acquiring unconventional weapons was crucial to attenuating the latent dangers represented by virulently anti-Western Islam. However, his mere replacement by another autocratic leader, Ba’athist or military, did not satisfy American interest in a risk-free Iraq; nor did it serve the larger ends of the emerging strategy for a political transformation of the Middle East as a whole.
It followed inexorably that regime change was essential. In the abstract, various types of regimes were imaginable. In the thinking of American leaders, only the building of a constitutional democracy made sense. This was true for three perceived reasons. First, a democracy where the exercise of power is based on the consent of the governed is the sole political arrangement that provides assurance against reckless state actions. This judgment is predicated on the doctrinal belief that the citizenry at large has no appetite for war; and that it harbors no grandiose dreams of national or religious glory through demonstrated prowess on the battlefield. Indeed, the citizenry at large sees war as squandering scarce economic resources and putting in jeopardy their safety. This essentialist Kantian postulate thrives in official Washington, by no means only within neo-conservative circles. The downfall of a rogue regime in Baghdad meant an end to an incubator, refuge or collaborator of terrorists of all stripes.
Washington saw itself as having a critical catalytic role to play in that reform process. It could encourage elites, cajole current officeholders, and propagate a vision of a better future to the Muslim street. Such initiative, it was argued, will not be taken as alien or intrusive since it coincides with the interests, proclivities and aspirations of the large majority. Crucial to the success of this enterprise is the living model of a liberalized Arab country, one that functions as a working democracy, that allocates economic resources to the welfare of its populace and that nurtures a vibrant yet positive mode of Islam. Iraq was nominated for this role. Iraq thereby became the centerpiece of a far-reaching plan to reconfigure the political landscape of the Middle East. Europe opinion, official and otherwise, has been skeptical of this radical enterprise – for the most part. Skepticism stems from quite different historical experiences and sense of identity.
Morality & The American ‘Calling’
Americans and European leaders alike freely use the language of morality in proclaiming the ideals that inspire them. They also use moral values as well as hard interests as benchmarks for evaluating the probity of their actions and those of other governments. Yet the common language does not mean that they have the same moral sensibilities or apply them in the same way. Nor do they draw their moral principles from religious and secular sources in the same measure.
The United States’ keen sense of being destiny’s child preordained to lead the world into the light of freedom and democracy has oriented its thinking about its external relations. It is an article of faith to Americans that the country was imbued with political virtue at its founding. That idea has secular roots and religious ones. The United States is at once the embodiment of Enlightenment ideals and an expression of Providential will. American singularity can take one or another form, or combine them. Presidents as varied in their religious and intellectual persona as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush have proclaimed as given truth the nation’s mission to ‘improve’ the world. This theme of America as the ‘chosen nation’ resonates from Abraham Lincoln’s declaring America to be “the last, best hope on earth” to Woodrow Wilson’s offering American leadership for “the redemption of the world” to John F. Kennedy’s conjuring of “a rendezvous with destiny” to Ronald Reagan’s vision of America as the Biblical “city on a hill.’ George W. Bush has been exceptional in casting the American purpose in eschatological terms. His public remarks are suffused with evangelical references to the US being “called” by the “Maker of Heaven” who has imparted to the United States “a visible direction set by liberty and the Author of Liberty.” But the tradition harks back to the very beginning. Here is Thomas Paine: “America is its own mistress and can do what it pleases….America is a new character in the universe. She started with a cause divinely right….The cause of America is in great measure the cause of all mankind.”
[i]: None of this rhetoric strikes most Americans as odd or strained. American civic religion easily shades into a civic millennialism.
[ii]. The missionary version of America’s pre-destined role as world savior acquires a righteous dimension from being suffused with religious belief. But its more secular counterparts, which lacked explicit religious imagery, were no less zealous. Surely, American foreign policy during the Cold War did not suffer from a shortage of zeal or righteous passion inspired by a sense of mission in performing its fated task. Where Barack Obama’s thinking lies on the secular-divine continuum of American exceptionality will have some bearing on how he approaches the issues associated with being in the democracy promotion business. What is not in doubt is that he shares his predecessors’ core beliefs in what America is and what it should be in the world.
The American drive to judge, to pronounce and to instruct, exemplified by Condoleezza Rice’s school mistress-like sermons, is unsettling to many Europeans, and to most Middle Easterners, on two counts. First, it implicitly devalues the moral convictions of other nations while routinely implying that they have baser motives. Second, it is seen as simplistic in its facile assessments of right and wrong, the good and the bad. Finally, American unilateralism of moral judgment is precursor to the imposition of American views in identifying malefactors and meting out punishment. Belief in its more finely honed moral instincts reinforces the claim to superior political judgment. The absence of agreement from allies on interpretation or prescription gives pause only insofar are it has practical consequences. The absence of overt dissent is read as confirmation of America’s unique competencies.
The Greater Middle East Initiative
The grandiose Greater Middle East Initiative inaugurated in 2004 was designated as the omnibus vehicle for effecting a political transformation of the region in line with America’s higher mission. The Bush administration’s’ launch of its signature program for the region met with a frosty response from governments in the region and quiet doubts from most European governments.. The latter were taken aback by what they saw as the latest display of Washington’s audacity in mounting a campaign for radical, speedy political change. Europeans also were peeved by the lack of prior consultation. Most, democrats in Europe and in the Middle East, worried about a backlash that could stiffen resistance to the calls for liberalization from within Arab societies while exposing indigenous reformers to charges that they were agents of the United States. Too, the European Union members were distressed by Washington’s disregard of their own, low-key efforts, via the Barcelona Process, to open a dialogue on moves toward more open societies and accessible politics.
The original version of the plan leaked in February 2004, provoking sharp reactions. A modified set of proposals for the Bush administration’s strategy, renamed the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative (BMENA), was presented to the G-8 governments at their summit in Sea Island, Georgia in June where it won general acceptance. The outcome of extensive discussions, and strenuous efforts to overcome recalcitrance in Berlin and Paris, the new plan was presented as a common enterprise. Its inspiration and motor force was American, as was its brand name.
Europe
Europeans have had to reflect on how and why they should align themselves with the United States, and where they must part company. As one European analyst summed it up, “if opposition is impossible, unconditional support is inconceivable.”[iii] Europeans could not decline to associate themselves with the goal. After all, to allow themselves to appear blasé about autocratic rule and its malign effects would be to deny their own political birthright. All the same, they were more sensitive to the unwanted consequences of setting in motion forces that could destabilize strategic partners while opening the way for virulently anti-Western elements to gain power via the ballot box, e.g. in Saudi Arabia where fundamentalists would be the odds-on favorite in any fair and open election.
Therefore, they counseled flexibility to Washington and made flexibility a leitmotif of their own approach. Flexibility might help to advance the purposes of democracy promotion in terms of sensitivity both to local political circumstances and to timing. There are moments of greater and lesser susceptibility to external influences and well meant symbolic acts. No ideal time is identifiable – especially since the Europeans were imagining a long-term process, not a specific action. That said, some moments are more conducive than others to a publicized initiative. What is to be avoided above all, in stimulating a reflexive negative reaction because passions evoked by the region’s multiple conflicts, the American invasion of Iraq foremost among them, were running high.
The EU already had an established program of encouraging reform minded groups in the region. It came under the heading of the afore-mentioned Barcelona Process, so named for the initiative launched in the Catalan city in 1995. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership christened at that Conference has as its stated purpose strengthening the EU’s relations with the countries of the Mashriq and Magreb through an array of cultural, economic and political activities. Tutoring in the principles and workings of a liberal democratic polity had been one of its most prominent objective. Against this background, the question Europeans posed for themselves was: would their low-key efforts be energized by association with the United States’ enterprise or might they be jeopardized in the highly charged atmosphere created by heavy-handed American actions?
A discomforting reality that the multiple American interventions, direct and indirect, in the Middle East had ‘queered the pitch’ against all and any Western intrusions into the region. Washington’s collaboration with Israel in its 2006 assault against Hezbollah (and Lebanon generally), its insensitivity to civilian casualties, and then the American-led embargo/boycott of the elected Hamas government in Palestine, all stoked anger across the region. Those events, punctuated by the continuing traumas of Iraq, has meant that the Europeans’ own human rights credentials have become hostage to the moral vagaries of American behavior, to some unknowable degree. That line of analysis strengthened the case for a parallel European strategy for encouraging democratization in the Middle East rather than one integrated with the United States. Europeans do not feel they must observe a categorical imperative to judge and to guide others in campaigns of moral uplift. That is America, not Europe.
Post-modern Europe’s moral sensibility is humanistic. It is uneasy with grand formulations. Too, it is leery that impulsive, premature exercises in democracy building can open the way to rabid sectarian forces whose commitment to democratic forms is opportunistic. Most Europeans find unpersuasive this American belief in the pliability of societies and, therefore, the swiftness with which they can be transformed. History has instilled in them the conviction that the past casts its shadow over the present in ways that set bounds on how far and how fast enduring change can be made, however desirable it may be. The United States, in a sense, was “born against history.” Its founding as a democratic republic was a break from all past experience on a virgin territory distant from the old centers of civilization. Europeans have lived enveloped by their all too eventful history.
Self-identities, therefore, remain different. Whereas Americans see themselves mandated the mission to light the path for the rest of the world, Europe lacks an analogous sense of mission. It was not anointed by Providence or Destiny to do good in the world. Their community was created arduously by pragmatic men inspired as much by dread of repeating the past as realizing a dream. Its focus has been wholly introspective.
The meaning of the EU’s ‘Good Neighbour’ policy for the Mediterranean, embodied in the Barcelona process, was underscored by President Nicolas Sarkozy’s much heralded plan for a Union of the Mediterranean in2007-08. This French conception was vague on substance. It striking innovation was a proposed restriction on the European membership to those countries bordering the Mediterranean. Funding would be provided by all the EU 27 members. Predictably, Sarkozy’s brainchild met with a lukewarm response from northern European states, Germany’s Angela Merkel leading the critics. A classic community compromise was reached at a Ministerial meeting on March 13, 2008. The Barcelona process was slated to be “upgraded,” and “revitalized” in a relaunch by the European Union as a single entity.[iv] With the amalgamated title of ‘The Barcelona Process – Union for the Mediterranean,” the program is slated to have a small secretariat to help coordinate projects. The Commission moved quickly to take hold of the reins, thereby blunting France’s ambition to head a new, autonomous structure. The new model was unveiled in Paris on July 13 amidst much fanfare. However, significant enhancement of European influence on Middle Eastern political developments looks unrealistic. Nothing basic in the equation has changed. Rhetoric stands in contrast to the limited capacity of Europeans, whether acting singly or together, to make an appreciable difference so long as they defer to the United States’ jealous control the field of action., and so long as democracy promotion is hostage to American conduct. A challenge to that state of affairs requires a measure of self-confidence that they lack.
Together In Democracy Promotion?
Most Europeans do not share the confidence that clever constitutional architecture in itself can ensure against the victors abusing that power; nor can it prevent the rise to power of fiercely sectarian or militant fundamentalist elements. The outcome of elections in Algeria, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt and Iran feeds that skepticism. If this European skepticism is well-founded, then a number of conclusions follow. One, time frames lengthen. Therefore, ways need to be found for well-wishers to provide sustained encouragement and engagement. Two, tutelage can be a valuable assist. How though can it be provided without trespassing on the autonomy of existing state authority? Regime change, after all, is the objective. But by what measure is it decided what the appropriate and effective means are, with what deference to the wishes of local rulers? in collaboration will local liberal forces? Is it the ‘West,’ the constellation of working democracies, the world community that does the deciding? Who directs a modulated set of programs at once congenial to the local culture and with the promise of being efficacious – democratic governments, their multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations? Finally, if entrenching a truly democratic polity is a long-term project, how can outsiders make these contributions without trying the patience of those it implicitly is tutoring and, thereby, compromising the very enterprise of democracy-building? The answers to these questions given by the United States and European governments are not likely to be identical. It remains to be seen whether they will prove to be compatible.
State of the Debate
Participants in the debate over democracy promotion in the GME now agree on the axiom that the fostering of democratic institutions and practices can succeed only if the process is sensitive to cultural and social circumstances. Those circumstances include past experiences with diverse modes of political life. Considerable discussion has addressed the issue of whether all societies are equally accommodating to democracy. When posed in the abstract, the proposition defies validation or invalidation. There are too many intervening variables, the empirical data too varied, to allow for confident conclusions.
Democracy itself is composed of multiple elements. One needs to separate to them and then use each as a benchmark against which to gauge a given country’s approximation to it. They include: the legitimization of rulers through open, competitive elections; the representation of the populace through their elected officials; legal limits on how the holders of governmental office exercise state powers; and the protection of individual human rights against abuse by political authorities. Differentiation among these components enhances the analytical value of an approach that is historically informed and culturally sensitive.
(To be continued)
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Dr. Michael Brenner is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations. He publishes and teaches in the fields of American foreign policy, Euro-American relations, and the European Union. He is also Professor of International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. Brenner is the author of numerous books, and over 60 articles and published papers on a broad range of topics.
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